

The Gulf War II and its Impact on Jordan (1990-2003)

The Jordanian Public Position towards The Gulf War II in 1990

Ayman Alkhatib ¹

^a Phd, Department of History, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, Iraq-Baghdad, Email: aymanzahra@gmail.com

* Corresponding Author: Ayman Alkhatib

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the Jordanian public's stance towards the Gulf War II in 1990, which was marked by a clear bias towards Iraq and condemnation of the international attack on it. Several factors influenced the public's position, including Mudar Badran's cabinet, which represented the official stance rejecting the war and calling for the resolution of the issue within the Arab community, while rejecting foreign interference. The manifestations of the Jordanian public's stance were not solely managed by regimes and governments; the public played a significant role in shaping foreign policy decisions. This coincided with the Muslim Brotherhood's entry into the Jordanian parliament, and both Islamic and Christian religious orientations favored supporting Iraq. Professional unions, the press, and the media also played a role in guiding the Jordanian public. One of the key findings of the research is that the Jordanian public's stance towards the Gulf War II was irrational, due to several factors that reinforced the perception that Iraq's victory was inevitable; some even considered Iraq's loss as a victory.

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1. Introduction

When Iraq occupied Kuwait, declared its final annexation to Iraqi territory, and established it as one of Iraq's provinces under a republican system of government, it led to the internationalization of the crisis. This resulted in the formation of an international coalition led by the United States, culminating in the Gulf War II and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003.

Examining the nature of the crisis and the Arab regime's handling of it, we can distinguish between two phases:

1. The phase of escalating verbal disputes between the two countries over various demands and claims.
2. The phase of the invasion and the declaration of Kuwait's annexation to Iraqi territory.

During these phases, the Arab countries were divided in their approach to the crisis into three orientations, despite a general Arab consensus against the annexation of Kuwait by military force (Abdel Majeed, 1990). These orientations were:

1. Advocating for the Arabization of the crisis and resisting its internationalization.
2. Calling for Arab and international coordination to resolve the crisis.
3. Supporting the internationalization of the crisis without an effective Arab stance.

This division negatively impacted the effectiveness and diplomacy of Arab states in their efforts to contain and resolve the crisis within the Arab world. Like other countries in the region, Jordan has always been influenced by its geopolitical surroundings and international relations, as well as factors stemming from its geographical, demographic, and economic situation. These include national wealth, foreign aid, social and economic transformations, and their implications on the composition and structure of Jordanian society (Hourani, 2008). The Gulf War was one of the harshest experiences for Jordanian decision-makers, as Jordan found itself directly involved in the crisis between two brotherly Arab countries with which it had close historical, geographical, political, and economic ties.

As one of the most pro-Western countries, it was surprising to many that most Jordanians sided with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein during the Gulf crisis. Both Arab leaders and the West were upset by King Hussein's reluctance to unite with them against Iraq (Reed, 1990). Although Jordan's official position favored a peaceful resolution, it was initially interpreted as siding with the opposing countries at the beginning of the crisis on August 5, 1990, when Jordan reserved its stance on a ministerial resolution issued by the Arab League condemning the Iraqi invasion. The reservation was due to Iraq's condition to withdraw if the Arab League did not issue a condemnation resolution. Saddam told King Hussein at the time, "If the League Council issues a resolution condemning Iraq, Abu Abdullah will see everyone in his land" (Badran, 2020, p. 275). Unfortunately, the reason for Jordan's reservation was to keep the door open for a possible peaceful solution (Matar, 1994).

Jordan's official and public rejection of the war was perceived as support for Iraq, which intensified over time due to the potential use of a military solution. This led to the deterioration of Jordanian-Kuwaiti and Jordanian-Gulf relations, as these countries interpreted Jordan's stance as support for the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Relations with the United States also deteriorated. After King Hussein's speech describing the war on Iraq as unjust, President Bush Sr. expressed concern about what appeared to be a shift in the Jordanian position, stating that Jordan had effectively moved into Saddam Hussein's camp (Matar, 1994, p.237). Bush Sr. summarized the US position by stating, "We will not allow any entity to control 20% of the world's oil reserves. It concerns the future and well-being of the American people, and if the Iraqi army does not withdraw, we will resort to force" (Governor, 2001).

Following his impassioned speech on February 6, 1991, King Hussein called for a ceasefire in the war against Iraq. He also declared that the allied efforts were against all Arabs and Muslims, not just Iraq, and aimed at asserting foreign hegemony in the Middle East. The US response was swift and threatening, with President Bush Sr. ordering a 'review' of the relatively meager US aid package to Jordan (\$20 million in military assistance and \$35 million in economic assistance) during 1991 (Jreisat & Freij, 1991).

The Jordanian public position:

The Jordanian publics pressured the decision-makers to move forward with the will of the people, support Iraq, and not accept participation in the coalition against Iraq (Alkhawaldeh & Ladiqi, 2021). The Jordanian position was a consensus between the government and the people to reflect the credibility of the Jordanian position and its orientation towards keeping the crisis within the Arab framework, developing the necessary solutions, preserving the interests and gains of the Arab nation, and not putting it at risk under Western interventions (White Paper, 1991).

As King Hussein explained more than once during his local and international press and radio interviews, 'We have a role to play, and they have a role to play: 'We have a role to play and our concern is to resolve the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict within the Arab framework... Any external attempt to intervene in the dispute will complicate matters in the region instead of resolving them...The issue between Iraq and Kuwait did not come out of a vacuum, and has been an issue for many years...We seek to live in security in our region, and our problems are the result of divisions created by external forces' (Al-Dustour Newspaper, 1990, 8244): 'The region is going through its most serious crises and we are capable of solving our own problems' (Al Dostour Newspaper, 1990, p. 8248). In an interview with the British television network, Prince Hassan explained that Jordan stands on the side of principles, which is why he was misunderstood, and pointed out that the Arab League's condemnation has hindered the Arab solution to the crisis (Al-Rai Newspaper, 1990, p. 7349).

2. The uniqueness of the Jordanian public stance

Public position has played an influential role in making foreign policy decisions (Tallilan, 2000), and public position is one of the modern terms that have multiple definitions according to different thinkers, disciplines, and interests. according to the multiplicity of thinkers, specialisations and interests, but these definitions agree that the issue or matter around which opinions, visions and feelings are formed, whether in agreement or disagreement, is the focus of public position and the focus of that issue In the field of political science, researchers have considered public position to be an important output of social and political socialisation, and some even consider it to be an embodiment of the prevailing political culture in society, as it reflects the pattern of values, attitudes and political beliefs of its members, and it is also the mechanism by which these values, attitudes and beliefs are expressed at a particular moment and on a particular issue (Gharaibeh, 2005).

The unity of the Jordanian public's position, especially the declared and loud position, which resonated and had a visible impact by supporting Iraq, welcoming the war and optimistic about its outcome, was evident, and the opposition party in Jordan, including media men and intellectuals, was not able to speak out, not even their opinion. (Omar, 2010), and even rational politicians did not dare to openly express their opinions, and the silence and the unheard voice remained the only thing that embodied their position under the name (the chanting of the silent ones). Taher al-Masri (2021, p. 232), who was then Minister of Foreign Affairs in Mudhar Badran's cabinet, noted: 'Jordan has witnessed a kind of mass public outburst in defence of Iraq, and although he was not in favour of this public consensus and reflected his position in The Lower House in a way that ensured he did not challenge people's feelings, he explained logically and objectively the dangers facing the region in general and Jordan in particular and explained the consequences of the actions of The Lower House in support of the Iraqi position. The Lower House decided to send parliamentary delegations to Muslim countries related to the situation in Iraq, including Turkey, and to ask its parliament not to participate in the war against Iraq; however, Turkey was not willing to do so, as it wanted to have a place in drawing the map of the new region.' The Jordanian parliament was in a state of mobilisation to support Saddam Hussein and tried to work through official parliamentary delegations to go to friendly Islamic countries to urge them not to participate in the Iraq war, and after the Turkish delegation, the parliament did not send other delegations.

This indicates the power of Jordanian public position and its sweeping energy, which was calculated, as what is written in the newspapers became what the public position wanted, and in front of this flood, Jordanians found a clear position to stand with Iraq in this crisis, and this position was outside their culture and values. This position was outside of their culture and values. They used religious, moral, ethical, nationalist, political and historical criteria that overlapped and formed a strong fabric towards supporting Iraq and dreaming of Iraq's victory over the allies, and reason was absent from their reactions.

Before delving into the details of the public position during Gulf War II in 1990, we must pause to review the situation of the Jordanian public during the 1980s, which was replete with many things that contributed to creating this trend towards supporting Iraq, as Jordan witnessed fundamental internal political changes, the most important of which were:

I. The disengagement decision from the West Bank administratively and legally on 31 July 1988:

In response to the Arab consensus to emphasize Palestinian identity and enable the PLO to fulfill its responsibilities and represent the Palestinian people in matters related to the Palestinian cause (Taliban, 2000), King Hussein decided to disengage in accordance with the decisions of successive Arab summits since the Arab League's 1974 decision to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This decision aimed to enhance the prospects of an independent Palestinian state and improve relations with the PLO, which had been strained for decades.

The Palestinian National Council declared an independent Palestinian state in Algiers in 1988. The decision to legally and administratively disengage from the West Bank led to the flight of Palestinian funds from Jordan and a decline in remittances from the Gulf. Additionally, the end of the Iraq-Iran war contributed to the collapse of the Jordanian dinar's exchange rate in 1988 to less than half its value, and a significant rise in prices by 26%, resulting in social unrest and protests (Shaer, 2007).

II. The protests in the south of Jordan in 1989:

The so-called "April Revolution" (Shaer, 2007), also known as the "Bread Revolution" or the "South Uprising," took place in Ma'an on April 17, 1989. During this uprising, 8 people were killed and 18 were wounded. The initial trigger was the Zaid al-Rifai cabinet's decision to increase fuel prices, but the underlying cause was widespread corruption that had escalated the country's debt to eight billion dollars. The depletion of reserves by Rifai's cabinet in 1987 and 1988, the mortgage and sale of Central Bank gold, and the state's borrowing from the Central Bank under the decisions of the Committee of Economic Security, which had the force of law, further exacerbated the situation (Nabulsi, 2006).

The government used its legislative power to borrow exceptionally from the Central Bank without adhering to public debt laws or Central Bank regulations, which explicitly prohibit such borrowing. Senior officials also borrowed personally from commercial banks to buy dollars from money exchangers, followed by the government's floating of the dollar, which halved the value of the Jordanian dinar. This was compounded by the Petra Bank scandal and bankruptcy (Badran, 2020; Al-Sati, 2019). The government pursued a policy of spending and borrowing, leading to a budget deficit that reached 48% of public expenditure before accounting for grants and aid, and 33% after. As a percentage of GDP, the budget deficit during 1987 and 1988 reached 11% and 13%, respectively, before accounting for grants and aid. The last Saudi payment was made in 1988, and the Central Bank's balance of foreign currency reached zero, with debt interest amounting to \$925 million, highlighting the extent of financial and administrative corruption (Al-Amoush, 2008).

By the end of 1988, the value of external and internal public debt had risen to \$4,757 million. The Central Bank's reserves of hard currency ready to cover imports decreased to the equivalent of only 20 days of imports. After deducting what was held by banks licensed by the Central Bank, which provided some deposits to strengthen the reserves, the Central Bank's reserves were estimated at minus 111 million dinars. About 28% of its gold holdings were sold to boost the deteriorating reserves, with gold holdings falling from 1.32 thousand ounces at the end of 1987 to 743 thousand ounces at the end of 1988 (Al-Nabulsi, 2006)

This situation was worsened by high population growth and changing consumption patterns, despite the importation of Iraqi oil at symbolic prices. The lack of productive investments increased poverty and unemployment among the youth. The dramatic drop in oil-related remittances after the collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s led to an unprecedented economic and social crisis. Jordan was unable to pay its foreign debts, and unemployment rose from 3% to 20% between 1980 and 1989. To alleviate this crisis, Jordan requested IMF aid in February 1989. The IMF imposed an economic reform policy on Jordan, which included the privatization of public enterprises, a moratorium on appointments in state services, and a drastic reduction in subsidies for basic commodities and oil derivatives. These measures had significant effects on the entire population, especially the poorer population in the south and east—Ma'an, Tafila, and Karak governorates. Nine days after the announcement of the first economic reform measures, unrest broke out in these governorates from April 19-22, with tangible social and political consequences (Nabulsi, 2006).

III. The 1989 parliamentary elections:

As a result of the protests, this period witnessed a fundamental political decision: the return of parliamentary life to the country after a major interruption with the elections of November 8, 1989 (Abu Rumman and Haniyeh, 2012). These were the first elections since 1974, following a hiatus due to various political circumstances, including the defeat in the 1967 war, the loss of the West Bank, and the emergence of resistance movements demanding the liberation of Palestine. The events of Black September, the introduction of emergency and martial laws, and the 1974 Arab League's recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people created a challenging atmosphere for civil society (Al-Hammad, 2020).

The disengagement decision and the measures taken before it came immediately after King Hussein's return from the Arab Summit held in Algiers, where the desire to make the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people was expressed, enabling it to gain legal cover to enter the peace process (Barghouti, 2008).

These elections were characterized by the prominence of Islamists, who ran on a unified list under the slogan "Islam is the solution." The Muslim Brotherhood participated with a list of 29 candidates, along with several independents, and 22 of them succeeded. The Brotherhood supported Mudar Badran's fourth cabinet (1989-1991), and Abdul Latif Arabiyat was elected Speaker of the Lower House for three consecutive sessions of the eleventh parliament (Gharaibeh, 2005). This led to a significant opening towards political pluralism and the return of parliamentary life, marking the longest phase of political openness in Jordan's history. Unlike the short experiences of the 1950s and 1960s, this phase was driven by internal social, economic, and political transformations rather than external pressures and challenges.

In 1989, the government took a series of appeasement measures and opened up politically to civil society organizations, lifted restrictions on the press, and allowed banned parties to field candidates for parliamentary elections (Al-Hammad, 2020). The government largely turned a blind eye to the activities of political parties after adopting the principle of political pluralism. To achieve national interest, members of unlicensed political parties and organizations were accepted as candidates due to the application of Article 18(e) of the Electoral Law of 1986, which prohibits unlicensed organizations whose principles are inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution from running for elections (Al-Salih, 2012).

3. Forces influencing the Jordanian public stance during Gulf War II:

4. When analysing the public stance, we note that it was irrational and interpreted its position by standing on the side of the dictatorship and approving the occupation of Kuwait. The Jordanian public solidarity with Iraq and its various political tendencies and groups showed its categorical rejection of the landing of the coalition forces in the Saudi desert with the aim of striking Iraq, and the demonstrations gathered tens of thousands of people on several occasions and festivals organised by the Jordanian government. The demonstrations, which gathered tens of thousands of people, took place on several occasions and festivals organised by Jordanian parties and unions, as well as from the writings of journalists and intellectuals in official newspapers, and this position was governed by several issues that directed it to support Saddam Hussein, including:

I. Components of the Lower House representatives:

The results of the elections reflected the sincerity of the government in its orientation to consolidate the Jordanian democratic transition and strengthen it in the Jordanian public of all origins and origins (Abdul Rahim, 2021). parties regained their legitimacy and registered other parties representing the centrist and conservative currents (Abdel Fattah, 2011), and Brotherhood MPs participated in Mudar Badran Cabinet in 1991 through five non-sovereign ministerial portfolios, and this new reality allowed for the emergence of several political forces The Jordanian National Assembly held an emergency session on the second day of the war, 18 January 1991, at the end of which it reiterated its condemnation of the war and called on all countries of the world to make efforts to end the war. the world to make efforts to stop it as soon as possible, and issued a statement condemning what it described as aggression against Iraq and calling on the countries of the Islamic world to strike American interests and allied countries (Rumaihi, 1994), and the Jordanian Lower House held an emergency session on the second day of the war, 18 January 1991. held an emergency session on the second day of the start of the comprehensive attack on Iraq, at the end of which it issued a statement affirming that 'the brutal aggression against the brotherly Iraqi people led by America and its allies is an aggression against all Arab and Islamic peoples' (Al-Rai, 1991).

II. Mudhar Badran Cabinet:

The government, represented by its president, Mudhar Badran, emphasised the Arab solution to the conflict, and the parliament, both the upper and lower houses, overwhelmingly supported the government in its positions (Al-Sati, 2019), and Badran announced the government's position by saying: 'We will not recognise a republican system in Kuwait, and our recognition of the Amiri system still stands' (Al-Dustour, 1990, p.8247). In order to strengthen the internal front, Badran's Cabinet informed the MPs of the facts. He informed the MPs of the cut-off of Arab aid and the difficult economic situation, but the MPs' demands were fanciful, as the budget situation is difficult, and the economic situation is suffering after the cessation of Arab and foreign aid (Badran, 2020).

Although Badran was one of the opponents of the occupation of Kuwait and warned before the occupation about the danger of this, he told Taha Yassin Ramadan: '...that they should convince Saddam not to be reckless, as this will harm the interests of all of us' (Badran, 2020, p. 271), but like other political officials at the time, he acquiesced to the demands and directions of the public trends in favour of Iraq, while trying to put logic in his statements and discussions with the House of Representatives, and to fortify the home front, Badran's Cabinet did several things:

- 1- Public mobilisation to organise the Public Army, which reached 235,000, including 94,000 regular soldiers, 53,000 reservists, and 88,000 in the military service.

2- Continuous coordination was carried out with the Lower House, where the House was briefed on the most important developments of the international position against Iraq from the beginning to the end of the crisis.

3- To empower the home front, Badran's Cabinet reshuffled its cabinet on 1 January 1991, and the Islamic Movement's MPs were included in the government.

4- Refusing to discuss Jordanian military plans with MPs, securing possible preventive measures, securing the requirements of daily life, purchasing mobile pumps and generators to operate bakeries in case of electricity cuts, and distributing food supplies to the governorates according to the size of the population (Badran, 2020).

III. The Muslim Brotherhood Party:

The Jordanian state was founded on conservative, secular and religious principles. The establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was approved on 19 November 1945 and was compatible with these principles until 1989. The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood Party and the regime varied between symbiotic relations based on mutual support between the two parties, and multiple hostile interactions. In 1989, the democratisation process came as a test of the Jordanian political system's ability to coexist with manifestations of political pluralism, especially with the Muslim Brotherhood, and to contain and diminish its influence, but Gulf War II came and when King Abdullah II came to power in 1999, the Jordanian political system favoured limiting the power of the Brotherhood and retreating from democratisation, while maintaining effective channels of communication between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood (Bani Salameh, 2021).

In the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood was an active force in student associations and had a significant presence in universities, reflecting the spirit of the public political shift from nationalism and leftism in favour of the new rising Islamist forces, as well as the rise of professional unions (Abu Rumman and Haniyeh, 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood possessed the organisational and political capacity and qualified professional leadership cadres, and they were able to influence the Jordanian public, leading the leftist and nationalist parties that work for them, professional unions, university student councils, zakat committees, and mosque pulpits (Abu Rumman and Haniya, 2012). Zakat committees, mosque pulpits, associations for memorising the Holy Quran, organised women's influence, investment financial institutions, elected local municipal councils, and others that provide them with the ability to organise people's movement and force them to pursue their political goals (Pharaohs, 2004). They played an important role in organising marches, mobilising the publics, holding demonstrations, festivals and events to support Iraq, denounce the unjust aggression, and address all international organisations and bodies, the Arab League, and liberation movements to demand an end to the aggression against Iraq (Al-Najadat, 2007), as invested all their public reserves to achieve this accomplishment of 22 seats in the parliament.

During the war, King Hussein's publicity peaked in Jordan, and the vast majority sympathised with Iraq. For the first time, the regime allowed and encouraged anti-Western demonstrations in public places, and the Muslim Brotherhood's hand was released to mobilise public support for the King's policy against Western intervention in the Gulf; this marked an important stage in the group's history and its relationship with the Jordanian government, after it became a strong presence on the Jordanian scene. In the absence of any competitor from other political forces, it began to achieve a public and mass presence in that period (Mualla, 2021), and there was a public Islamic delegation led by the Muslim Brotherhood that gathered in Jordan from all countries (Tunisia, Syria, Sudan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Jordan), and met King Hussein, who blessed their efforts and then set off to Saudi Arabia and Iraq, but Saddam assured them that Kuwait is the nineteenth province (the province of the call) (Al-Amoush, 2006). The Gulf crisis was one of the few chapters in Jordan's history in which the positions of the regime, the army, the parliament and public opinion were almost completely aligned (Ammon, 2007).

In general, parties of different orientations, beliefs and ideologies viewed the crisis as a Western attack targeting a brotherly Arab country that had honourable positions in all forums, wars and crises faced by the Arab nation, and stood by Iraq and called for a peaceful resolution of the crisis to stop the bloodshed, within the Arab umbrella and within the framework of the Arab League (Al-Najadat, 2007).

Support for Saddam was present on a daily basis, and on several occasions, including conferences, events, press meetings, and rallies sponsored by the leftist Democratic People's Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, all of which were unified in their events in terms of cursing the deposed Kuwaiti ruling family for wasting Arab wealth, cursing their supporters from Saudi Arabia and Egypt as traitors, burning American flags, and chanting for Saddam: "Ready to die for you" (Reed, 1990). The People's Newspaper (1990, p. 2664) published the headline: (In a mass rally organised by the Muslim Brotherhood, 50,000 citizens took part in the Event of Confrontation, the flags of the colonial countries were burned by children dressed in the flags of Jordan (the country of undeterred warriors), Palestine (the country of Revolution), and the masses chanted: "Repent the hands of the traitors in Muslim countries, shame and disgrace for America and its agents, and death and destruction for those who sold the homeland" in the capital Amman.

When the crisis in the Gulf erupted, Jordanian public position was ready and did not hesitate. Jordanians did not see the crisis as an Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute; rather, the conflict had become a foreign Arab conflict led by Iraq on one side and America on the opposite side (Barakat, 1992). The Muslim Brotherhood Party's position during the Gulf War was fully supportive of Iraq and reacted to the gravity of the situation through a number of activities, including: Demanding the resolution of the crisis within the Arab framework based on the rejection of the occupation of Kuwait and the rejection of American intervention in this matter, and issuing successive statements that inform the nation of the reality of what is happening and call on it to take the appropriate stance. In the statement of the Islamic Movement, it emphasized that it renews its firm stand with the Iraqi people and army, and its withdrawal from Kuwait closes a stage of jihad (Al-Rai Newspaper, 1990, p. 7404), and sent memoranda aimed at explaining the vision, working to gain support for the Iraqi people's position against the foreign invasion, holding mass rallies to raise awareness and mobilize energies towards the nation's issues, forming support and relief committees for the Iraqi people, and holding press conferences explaining the position of the Islamic Movement's MPs and calling on the nation to fulfill its responsibilities (Al-Baddour, 2011).

The Lower House was predominantly nationalist-Islamic, which was reflected in the positions of the House. Among the letters addressed to Mudhar Badran Cabinet from the Lower House:

- The House elected in this session a committee on the events between Iraq and Kuwait, then issued a statement on 5/8/1990 that emphasized the keenness to address the situation away from foreign interference, especially the United States (Session 14, 1990, p. 10)

- The session was attended by the Iraqi public delegation headed by Abdul Wahab al-Haithi, and suggestions were made to send a telegram to US President Bush and Russian President Gorbachev at the Helsinki summit, appealing to them for the justice of positions and the prevalence of the spirit of truth by applying the resolutions of the United Nations. The Council affirmed its support for US President Bush and Russian President Gorbachev at the Helsinki summit, calling on them to justify their positions and the spirit of truth by applying UN resolutions, convening an international peace conference, de-escalating the situation in the Gulf, and condemning the US project aimed at establishing a military alliance in the region led by the United States, as the establishment of such an alliance would re-colonize the Arab world. The Council affirmed its support for President Saddam Hussein's holy jihad against US imperialism and its allies, and sent a telegram to the Turkish Parliament to appeal to Turkey not to be a paw for aggression against Iraq and to authorize Turkey to declare war in order to support Arabs and Muslims (Session 15, 1990, p. 5).

- Issuing a statement on behalf of the Jordanian Lower House against the US war resolution and declaring support for the Iraqi people (Session 4, 1990, p. 57).

- The report called for a unified council to coordinate public and official efforts in the areas of national guidance, and to mobilize all energies within the framework of a comprehensive plan for steadfastness entitled comprehensive national economic, military and media mobilization, and to adopt the idea of forming a joint committee from the government and the Lower House to contact all public activities, trade unions, professional, labor, women and youth unions, with the aim of forming this desired council. The report calls for the distribution of weapons to all members of the People's Army, the training of all people to carry weapons, the development of an organized plan for their distribution, the provision of safe shelters, and the allocation of the necessary funds. On the issue of fundraising, MP Abdul Rahim al-Akour said: "... We got the publics engaged in the matter, and we told people to collect donations...". The government explained to the council that weapons were immediately distributed in the areas adjacent to the border with Israel from the north to the south of the country to the members of the Public Army, which exceeded 100,000 members, and the government considered that the best plan to organize the Public Army was to organize its units in the form of groups, factions and armed companies that join the regular military units (Session 23, 1991, p. 73). - At one of the discussions (28, 1991, p.14), the session was dominated by the Brotherhood's conviction of Saddam's victory over the enemies, emphasizing the need to stand as one man in the face of Zionist expansionist attempts and American hegemony. The Brotherhood called on the Council to adopt the demands contained in the memorandum of Yarmouk and Science and Technology Universities, which demanded to put strong pressure on the government to arm the people, especially university students, and to turn universities into military barracks, to cut diplomatic relations with all countries participating in the aggression against Iraq, to open the door for volunteering for Iraq, and to form jihad and martyrdom brigades to defend the homeland (p. 15), reminding the world that the Palestinian cause is the first cause of the nation and that the US-Zionist policy of blocs and games designed to leave the burden of the issue on the PLO alone and abandon the Palestinian people will not succeed, and asking the government to study the issue with the utmost seriousness and urgency. with Iraq all the ways in which Jordan can support Iraq's steadfastness and rebuild what can be built of Iraq's infrastructure that facilitates the livelihood of its people and ensures the operation of its services to facilitate their resumption of the battles of honor they are fighting (p. 8), and accused the government of implementing only the minimum of what the Lower House's demanded (p. 12).

- The Lower House affirmed at its session (29, 1991, p. 59) the firm rejection of all forms of foreign presence on Arab and Islamic lands, waters, and airspace) affirmed the firm rejection of any form of foreign presence on Arab and Islamic lands, waters and airspace and the need to build an integrated Arab-Islamic system that is consistent with the aspirations, ideology, values and civilization of the nation and guarantees the fair distribution of its wealth and its employment in building its economic and military strength and capabilities in order to ensure its security and stability. its wealth and employ it in building its economic and military strength and capabilities to ensure its security and stability, with a focus on continuing mass mobilization in raising the spirit of jihad, martyrdom, exertion and giving in all fields, and by all official and non-governmental actors. By all official and public activities and continuing to support the People's Army by all means as a companion force to the armed forces, with commitment to Iraq's approach in confronting the US-Atlantic-Zionist aggression against the nation, and standing by its leadership, army and people to continue this national approach to liberation from foreign dependence and control and preserving the identity of the nation, and the Council emphasized participation in the construction and reconstruction of Arab and Islamic Iraq in all fields.

- In the 32nd session (1991, pp. 77-79)), the Muslim Brotherhood denounced the Jordanian government's position of warmly welcoming the international conference and Bush Jr.'s speech, and how the government changed its position overnight and received the ministers of the coalition, and the Brotherhood declared its rejection of the projects put forward in the arena of the Palestinian cause They believe that the only solution is jihad, martyrdom, and preparing the nation for this, calling on the media not to promote these surrender solutions and that there is no surrender of an inch of the land of Palestine, and emphasizing Iraq's struggle, besides MP Ahmed al-Kufhi demand of that the voice of jihad be raised above all others and that all energies be devoted to its service.

IV. The Professional Unions:

Professional and labor unions have declared their support for Iraq, and unions are an important tool of civil society, and they have a great role in achieving a kind of social solidarity among the workers under them, and thus represent for the worker a larger family than his real family, and the union is characterized by its ability to give the member enough space to highlight his opinions and ideas in the field of specialization, where there is more flexibility and fewer restrictions. (Kishana, 2019). A statement by the Council of Presidents of Professional Unions in Jordan described the day of Iraq's entry into Kuwait as "a historic day in the life of the Arab nation" (Sharaf, 1991, p. 130-133), thus recognizing the legitimacy of Iraq's entry into Kuwait, and portrayed Iraq's entry as the best solution to the problems of Iraq and the region (Al-Mousa, 1988), so conferences were held in support of Iraq, including the Conference of Arab Public Forces held in Amman from September 14-16, 1990. The conference also called on the Arab and Islamic countries to denounce the blockade imposed on Iraq. The United States expressed its rejection and denunciation of this conference, and Al-Rai Newspaper in its issue 7259, headlined in the words of the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Ezzedine, a conference which was held in Amman on September 14-16, 1990, that the holding of the Public Forces Conference in Amman is an internal affair and no one has the right to guide us on what to do or not. The Jordanian government justified the holding of such conferences as a result of the democracy practiced by the publics, a justification that did not convince the US administration (Al-Mousa, 1988)

The Professional unions have a prominent role in guiding public opinion in Jordan, as they represent important segments of Jordanian society. Their effectiveness increased after the freezing of party work, which strengthened their role on the political scene, especially with the presence of union leaders who enjoy an important position and role due to their intellectual, political, and organizational background. The professional unions have clearly focused on political issues since their establishment in Jordan, which influenced their professional performance and allowed the amendment of their laws in the early seventies of the last century. In the early 1970s, which gave the right to the executive authority represented by the Council of Ministers to dissolve professional unions, as their existence and continuation threatened public safety, and the new law required the approval of the Cabinet for the establishment of any professional society, which shows the extent of the executive authority's control over civil society organizations (Al-Hammad, 2021). The heads of Jordanian professional syndicates visited the Iraqi embassy to express their support for Iraq (Al-Dustour Newspaper, 1990, p. 8249).

Press and Media

Media discourse is a cultural industry that is produced by multiple media, which is evident in the nature of the messages that flow through this discourse, its speed, methods of distribution and how it is received; this makes media the main axis in the system of society as it is an industry that combines language, information, cultural content, and mechanisms of communication across time and space, as well as a diverse linguistic and informational product within the framework of a specific social and cultural environment, which has a great ability to influence the audience. Media discourse is a diverse linguistic and news product within the framework of a specific social and cultural environment, which has a great ability to influence the recipient, reshape his consciousness, shape his future visions and crystallize his opinion, according to the technical media he uses and the cognitive bases from which he originates. The media has a strong relationship with ideology, which are the basic systems through which social attitudes are perceived and organized, and indirectly control the formation of the context of discourse. In the second Gulf War, the media was present with all its weight (Al-Khaddam, 2012), and some consider it an important element of the political system in its broadest sense. They believe that the political system in its broadest sense is the link between the inputs and outputs of the political system, and they expressed it as feedback through which society evaluates the government's decisions and policies, and thus either supports the regime and mobilizes support for it, or puts pressure on it to modify its policies or decisions (Jmes bill, 1981).

It is noticeable that Iraq's efforts during the 1980s were directed towards building military power and media activity, where the Iraqi media received unlimited largesse in spending, with the aim of shifting Iraqi and Arab public opinion towards supporting the policies of the Iraqi regime. The media mobilization practiced by the Iraqi regime before the occupation of Kuwait achieved some gains of support from some powers and regimes outside Iraq, especially when it announced that it would incinerate half of the Zionist entity with its double chemical missile, thus striking focal point of liberating Palestine, where some forces and their leaders believed that a new Arab era would emerge after the Arab defeats and suffering since 1948 and the subsequent absence of Nasser, the nationalist symbol, from the Arab arena (Al-Tamimi, 1992).

In the media, Saddam Hussein was inflaming emotions and raising the pace of his rhetorical threats to the West as the Western military buildup in the Gulf region increased. In a meeting on January 11, 1991, Saddam (1979-2003) told a crowd of supporters at the Islamic People's Congress in Baghdad: "Let your hearts be assured of victory, we will face them with one million soldiers who are immersed in the ground." He said: "Iraqi planes can fight them day and night without the need to contact the headquarters" (Al-Sati, 2019, p.449). Saddam Hussein's promises of victory over America, the missiles fired at the Zionist entity and his threats to wipe it out, inflamed the emotions of the masses in Jordan and in the Arab world.

The official newspapers reported the news of the marches and contributed to the mobilization of pro-Iraqi marches. Al-Dustour newspaper (1990, p. 8249) headlined that Jordanian volunteer support Iraq and demand to participate in its defense through a march by a group of volunteers in front of the chanting slogans in support of the Iraqi president and condemning the United States, and gathered at the end of the march in front of the Iraqi embassy in Amman, demanding that they be transferred to Iraq to defend Arab security. The official newspapers were full of expressions of congratulations, congratulations and support for Saddam Hussein, either personally or on behalf of clans or families in both Jordan and Palestine, and newspapers were full of news of festivals, events and conferences in support of Iraq and conferences in support of Iraq, and published congratulatory telegrams such as those of the Women's Public Committee in Madaba praising the nationalist stances of King Hussein and calling on the International Women's Union to break the siege on Iraq (Al-Rai, 1990, p. 7310).

The public position was interpreted as being on the side of Iraq, against the use of military force, and not so much against Kuwait as against the United States. The Jordanian newspaper, Al-Ahli, wrote: "National responsibility requires all of us to stand by Iraq, not against our Arab brothers in the Gulf, first and foremost the Kuwaiti people, but against the Americans, and no other position is acceptable. The alignment is with the nation and its future, its conscience, its sanctities, and nothing else. Iraq today stands in the trench of the nation's choices, its future and its conscience, so do we stand with it or not?" While some pens went to emphasize the strength of the relations between Jordan and Iraq, and that it is natural for Jordanians to stand by their Iraqi brothers, such as what was mentioned in the Jordanian newspaper Al-Rai on 19/1/1990; however, Jordanian-Iraqi relations at the official and public levels are not the daughters of today, as the economic and political integration between the two countries began ten years ago (Barakat, 1992).

Pre-war mobilization and media reports

Jordanian newspapers were filled with declarations of support for King Hussein for his positions, along with an unparalleled public alignment, and the Jordanian media in its positions throughout the months of the crisis coincided with the official position of the government; indeed, the media in Jordan became an extension of the Iraqi media and propaganda with all its goals and orientations; and even the vocabulary used by this propaganda in its daily speech to the Arab masses (Al-Kindi, 2008). In Al-Rai newspaper (1990, p. 7340),

in the corner of the opinion platform, the headline: They want to abort the Arab renaissance, and another headline: Get them out of the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Rai (1990, p.7349) The deteriorating morale of US troops in Saudi Arabia is the soldiers' interest in getting a hot meal or a bath. The Constitution (1990, 8249) US forces would lose 5-6 armored divisions if they attacked Iraq.

In (1990, p.8284) the strength of the Iraqi economy will fail the boycott, and the Iraqi army is preparing for a life-or-death fight. Al-Shaab (1990, p. 2636): America is leading a global campaign to impose sanctions against Iraq. Baghdad (1991, p. 2826): We will defend every inch of Iraq's land and the coming time will witness the resurgence of an Arab-Islamic spirit. Saddam (1990, p. 2664): "If war breaks out, America will no longer be the first superpower, and Kuwait is part of Iraq and will remain forever." (1991, p. 2822) "Bush is crazy and paranoid". "Baghdad is in the process of establishing a national democratic system of government in Kuwait, Iraq will win and inflict shame and destruction on the Alliance of Aggression, enemy forces are committing suicide on Iraq's borders and dying like flies, Bush is gambling with his future in the White House, the Alliance of Aggression no longer has a weapon for ground surprise, Iraq used an American technological system for night vision."

V. The public orientation:

In addition to the above, the public trend was geared towards supporting Iraq wholeheartedly, and it may seem that things have gotten out of the hands of the state, but Mudar Badran's memoirs (2020) confirm that the state has controlled the situation but rationally, including what happened during the Al-Aqsa massacre on October 8, 1990, which further fueled the anger of the public and had a serious impact on the Jordanian interior and the public position. The massacre indicated Israel's intentions to draw Iraq into an early war, and the Jordanian public began to boil with anger over the martyrs and the desecration of Al-Aqsa, and marches began to take place and the obsession with insecurity appeared in Jordan, so the Badran government began to coordinate security with the unions and the Muslim Brotherhood, given the seriousness of the situation and the fear of infiltrators. They asked the Democratic Movement, whose star had begun to shine, to hold its festivals in the sports city in case of any crisis, as the volume of public mobilization was great, and Badran succeeded, thanks to the awareness of the public movements and their representatives from the parties and unions, and the Muslim Brotherhood's exercise of a conscious and careful role, to overcome the crisis completely.

Jordanian public events in support of the war

The Iraqi public delegation was warmly received and toured several Jordanian cities, where a public festival was held for the Bani Hamida tribes with the participation of the Iraqi public delegation that is currently visiting Jordan, and representatives of the Jordanian Arab National Democratic Assembly met the Iraqi public delegation; it even had a schedule of visits Al-Rai announced that the Iraqi public delegation would meet the people of Salt on Saturday evening, giving the location and time, and the representatives of the Jordanian Arab National Democratic Assembly would meet the Iraqi public delegation (Al-Rai, 1990, p. 7340), and in (p. 7345) the president of the University of Jordan would meet the Iraqi public delegation (Al-Rai, 1990, p. 7340).

Events were held, including one on current developments in the Arabian Gulf: The colonialist attack aims to redraw the region according to its interests (Al-Rai, 1990, p. 7340). Al-Shaab (1990, 2636) published a headline in bold : What Jordanian public and political actors say about US threats to Iraq and the Gulf, the US aggression against Iraq will inflame the entire Arab public to defend the honor of the nation, the Iraqi-Kuwaiti issue is an internal issue and should not be outside the scope of the Arab League, the Arab nation is capable of responding and striking the interests of the aggressor and is provoked by imperialist intervention, as it conducted interviews with a number of Jordanian journalists, intellectuals and politicians. Al-Dostour (1990, No. 8242): Al-Dustour observes reactions of Iraqi troops invading Kuwait.

Festivals were held in the capital, cities and villages condemning the United States of America, thousands announced their volunteering to participate in defending the land of Iraq and resisting the foreign invasion, thousands collected foodstuffs and sent them by truck to Iraq to support it in the siege imposed on it, and pro-Iraqi demonstrations broke out in Amman, especially directed to the American and Egyptian embassies in Amman to demonstrate the position of the Jordanian public (Mahaffa, 2001).

Several reasons can be identified for this large public support for Saddam, including:

1- The American reaction to the invasion in terms of enthusiasm, size and stated arguments, and the mobilization of the international coalition against Iraq, which obscured any negative opinion generated by Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, especially because of its policy towards the Palestinian issue. The reaction was not only deep skepticism and outrage at this randomness in moral choices, but also a deep fear of premeditated intentions.

2. People are tired of the cowardice of Arab leaders in the face of the Zionist entity's threats and its disregard for them, America's commitment to maintaining the Zionist entity's strategic superiority over any Arab state, and the feeling that there must be a deterrent to the Zionist entity. (Said, 1992), the rejection of the principle of self-determination for the Palestinians, and the rise of the mass expulsion of the Palestinians and the equation of Jordan is Palestine (Said, 1992); therefore, the emergence of someone like Saddam offered a kind of deterrence in the face of the Zionist entity.

3- The peace plan announced by Saddam on August 12, 1991, which is based on the principle of interdependence, meaning the simultaneous withdrawal of all occupying forces - whether Iraqi from Kuwait and Iran, or the Zionist entity from Palestine, southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights, or Syria from Lebanon - was accepted by many.

4- The lack of symmetry between the geography of wealth and population distribution and the demand for justice in the distribution of wealth due to the bankruptcy of institutions at the comprehensive Arab level; therefore, the vote for Saddam was not in favor of him or against Kuwait as much as it was opposed to the existing social and economic situation. The people expressed their categorical rejection of the landing of coalition forces in the Saudi desert and their gathering there with the aim of striking Iraq.

The Jordanian people's support for Iraq was fueled by their religious beliefs and nationalist sentiments while rejecting the West's total bias towards Israel.

Religious Orientation

The role of the Brotherhood grew gradually with the events of the crisis, and the Jordanian government did not try to limit the role of these groups, which have ideological positions of different orientations and affiliations, and they had the freedom to speak and declare, which helped shape the cultural structure of that period. In the period of the Gulf crisis, the impact of religion and ideologies on the cultural cognitive structure can be seen through the role of Jordanian public opinion in dealing with the events, standing by Iraq, welcoming the war and the emergence of the role of clerics in Jordan and the difference of their position from other clerics in Arab and Islamic countries that support the United States of America (Omar, 2010). King Hussein said during his tour to stop the military invasion in Germany: "This is the first time since the dawn of Islam that foreign forces have entered the Holy Land, and the biggest disaster is the presence of a number of American Jews in these forces, and if Arabs and Muslims hear about this, attitudes will change, and he emphasized that the attitude of the Arab and Islamic publics needs no proof of this. The Jordanian people express their position openly, and the rest of the peoples of the region cannot express the same because they lack the democracy that exists in Jordan" (Badran, 2020, p. 283).

In this period, religious thought was in line with Jordanian public opinion and the Jordanian official position due to the convergence of the official and public positions in this crisis. The official religious position of the state was also supported by the Mufti of the Kingdom, who affirmed that the aggression is launched by the forces of infidelity against Iraq, and that all fatwas issued permitting this attack are invalid (Al-Rumaihi, 1994). The newspapers published several headlines, including Al-Rai (1990, p. 7404) titled: Zarqa Endowments Directorate: Iraq stood alone against the forces of infidelity against Iraq: Iraq stood alone against the forces of infidelity and exposed the honest people of the Arab and Islamic nations, such as what was published by the People's Newspaper on August 4, 1990, No. 2636, under the title: Mosque preachers denounce the freezing of Arab funds by colonialist countries. The preachers pointed out that Arab money and oil is a powerful weapon if it is properly used and in safe hands, and considered that any money placed in foreign countries is tampering with the capabilities of the nation and taking it away from the desired role in the battle for liberation and dignity, and stressed the need to mobilize the nation to stand up to the Zionist and colonialist schemes and threats facing the nation.

We can observe that the positions of Muslim clerics and Christian clerics have converged (Omar, 2010). Ibrahim Al-Rawashdeh (in the Jordanian newspaper Al-Liwa, a near future scenario) wrote: "... about what is mentioned in the Holy Qur'an and the Hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad, and what is consistent with the Revelation of John in the New Testament and the Book of Hezekiah in the Old Testament, and projecting it onto the reality of the near future. about what is mentioned in the Holy Qur'an and the Hadith, and what is consistent with what is mentioned in the Revelation of John in the New Testament and the Book of Hezekiah in the Old Testament, and projecting them to our reality, which augurs well for good and victory in the current war (Barakat, 1992, p. 92)." (Barakat, 1992, p. 92). Father Nabil Haddad in an article in the Jordanian newspaper Al-Rai: "Bright impulses to Bush and his military on Christmas" ... stands openly against the United States and the presence of its military in the Arab region on Christmas: "I ask you, Mr. Bush, where is the joy and the meaning of Christmas based on the good news of joy and peace, this tone caused by your presence among us? Where are those wonderful Christmas carols ... Does your pursuit of war glorify God on high and bring joy to mankind?" (Barakat, 1992, p. 35).

The mentality of Jordanians was to stand with Iraq, welcoming war and jihad for the sake of God, and that there was an opportunity to kill enemies and infidels, and the Jordanian public was chanting for war, demanding change and rejecting the stillness of the reality that did not bring them the best, and welcoming war was part of a current that prevailed in Jordan, that the war, whatever it was, would be better than the reality. Of course, this phenomenon represents the despair to which the Arab people have reached, as they fantasize that the war will bring us out pure and the future will be bright (Omar, 2010).

Nationalism and patriotism

Arab nationalism is what makes up the structure of Jordanian society, consisting of citizens of Jordanian origin and citizens of Palestinian origin. This mixture was affected in terms of the number of citizens by factors imposed on Jordanian society after the 1948 war, the 1967 war, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the West Bank to the East Bank in Jordan, which changed the demographic and geographic realities of the society, and the ratio of the number of Jordanians of Jordanian origin and those of Palestinian origin within the new geographic reality of Jordan after the 1967 war. and the ratio of the number of Jordanians of Jordanian origin and those of Palestinian origin within the new geographical reality of Jordan after the 1967 war. The unity, brotherhood, cohesion and harmony of a single society was influenced by internal factors, and the nationalist thought of the Jordanian met with the Palestinian with an absolute national outlook on working for the Arabism of Palestine (Omar, 2010, p. 61). The Jordanians, because of their culture and because of their suffering from wars, have been affected by the losses and destruction caused by the United States of America due to its continuous support for the Zionist entity. By the nature of their culture, they reject foreign occupation. Arab culture as a feeling, belief, and behavior does not accommodate foreign presence and does not find justifications for it, even if its effectiveness in Arab relations can be disabled; foreign intervention in the case of the Gulf was an excellent activator that mobilizes all its assets and mechanisms. After this intervention, it was clear that the situation will not be the same as it was before, whatever the outcome of the conflict, at least in terms of the culture of the Arab's vision of himself and others, especially in the Arab Gulf, as well as some of his convictions and the way he understands Arab and international issues, and the use of concepts, sayings and slogans, all of which he will find himself pushed to reconsider.

This crisis proved the success of the first steps of democracy and the sincerity of the new political orientation in Jordan, as Ms. Leila Sharaf says: "... the official circles endured the impulses of the public position, the public circles endured the rationality and principles of the official position, and the official media endured the excesses of the private media expressing public emotions... During the crisis, Jordan was an arena for democratic experimentation and nationalist interactions, and the experiment succeeded" (Nahar, 1992, p. 112).

The illusion of victory and defeat

No one would have doubted for a moment the ability of Saddam Hussein's army to defeat the US forces, which can be explained by the lack of transparency of the regimes. The emotional bet of the masses seemed similar to the days of the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Just as the defeat of 1967 was a shocking and disastrous event for the Arab peoples who yearned for victory, the defeat of the Iraqi forces in record time was a great disappointment (Al-Sati, 2019). However, the media continued to broadcast support for a victorious Iraq even before the war began and predicted the logical outcome of Iraq's withdrawal. Al-Rai (1990, p. 7404) titled Saddam Hussein is a wise man: Palestinians in the occupied territories do not see Iraq's decision to withdraw as a defeat, and The Bride of Capitals: Whatever the outcome of the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and MP Haddadin, the battle is not over and will take new forms.

After the defeat, Al-Shaab (1991, p. 2826) headlined: Hours after the total annihilation of the forces of the aggression alliance in Dhi Qar, Bush announces a ceasefire as of this morning, and Badran: The withdrawal from Kuwait came within an organized military plan, the battle fought by the Iraqis has created a spirit of jihad and will soon bear fruit, and Iraq has made the Palestinian cause the most pressing issue: The war has begun and the decision to withdraw is a determination to win. Kuwaiti to Marines: Welcome to your home and country: Iraqi forces withdrew their equipment and weapons and transferred 5,000 prisoners to Baghdad; even the analysts' pens kept ringing who did not win for Iraq with the title: Testimony of failure to participate for those left out of the battle, titled Al-Rai (1991, p. 7519): Saddam announces the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. You, the noble ones, fought the forces of the alliance of 30 countries and won the victory of truth over falsehood, your victory is the victory of all honorable people, caution is obligatory and readiness to fight must continue, our forces respond to the enemy's attempts to interfere with the withdrawal of its formations, Iraqi heroism and American cowardice, our forces respond to the enemy's attempts to interfere with the withdrawal of its formations.

A rational view

Nineteen years after the end of the Gulf War, the situation has changed the entire region in all political, economic, and social aspects due to the dominance of emotion over reason and the clear contribution of the media, in cooperation with Islamic and other currents, in guiding and aligning with the irrational public trend and the submission of the official position to the desire of the people to maintain the security and stability of the state. and other Islamic and other currents to guide and go along with the illogical public trend, and the official position's submission to the people's desire to preserve the security and stability of the state, which led to a great shock and disappointment that reverberated on Jordan alone, and its loss was great on all levels. In fact, the Jordanian public attitude was supportive of the dictatorship, and the Jordanian public attitude can be justified by the following:

- The public expectation of Iraq's victory over the international coalition was accompanied by the mentality of welcoming war and jihad for the sake of God, and that there is an opportunity to fight the enemies and infidels, as Tariq Masarweh wrote: "... in war what serves the Arabs and their societies, so let it be, for we will not lose as a nation except its shackles, otherwise humiliation and contempt, and from the ashes, from the fires, the Arab nation will rise as the purest, the most glorious fighters for the life of their nation" (Barakat, 1992, p. 64).
- Iraq's support for the Palestinian cause, where the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict was a prominent point in the crisis because President Saddam Hussein linked the two issues - Kuwaiti and Palestinian - which led to the mobilization of many Arab masses to Iraq's side and their support, which was rejected by some Arab countries and put additional pressure on others (Tallilan, 2000).

- After the occupation of Kuwait, Iraq inflamed passions when it raised the issue of Arab money and Arab wealth, and the importance of this wealth being for all Arabs, and that this wealth should not be a monopoly for the people of the oil countries and denied to the rest of the Arabs, and the financial aid from the oil countries to Arab countries suffering from financial distress and high poverty rates was a form of the relationship. This was a form of relationship that had an impact on filling some of the deficits in the budgets of these countries, as if they were alms paid by the rich to the poor and the payer expects thanks and praise and wants in return loyalty, obedience, and refusal to criticize in any way. This was an accepted reality by officials in poor countries who had a share of this aid and thanked those who paid it (Abutaleb, 1995), and the official media focused on this, as Al-Dustour (1990, p. 8247) published the headline: "Saddam's Ummah will not return": Saddam: The nation will not return to its place without a struggle and jihad that puts wealth in the service of its lofty goals, and Al-Rai (1990, p. 7350) headline: Baker Saudi Arabia, UAE and Al-Sabah pledged to pay 12 billion dollars to finance the invasion until the end of the year.

Rationally, Iraq did not have the right to occupy all Arab oil, nor did it have the right to attack Kuwait, but the public had a different opinion, as it believed that the war would turn out in its favor and change the reality, as it viewed Iraq as representing the orientation of the Arab and Islamic nationalist dimension, and was raising the issues of distributing the revenues of the oil wealth to all Arabs. (Omar, 2010), as Iraq raised the issue of Arab economic development and collective Arab benefit from natural resources in an atmosphere of economic frustration (Al-Rumaihi, 1994). In reference to this, journalist Fahd al-Fank wrote: "Why are we siding with Iraq? It is not our fault that Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein have become symbols of the Arab will to endure; as for the explanation, I think it does not go beyond two factors: The first is that an Arab country, Iraq, stood up to Israel and achieved a kind of strategic balance with it, and the second is that Iraq represents the Arab country that called for the application of Arab oil for the Arabs" (Barakat, 1992, p. 25).

Iraq put forward slogans that appealed to Arab consciousness and nationalist dreams, such as confronting Israel and linking withdrawal from Kuwait with Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, which was clarified by Saddam Hussein in a speech on August 12, 1990, where he declared readiness to discuss all issues immediately and at once, i.e. the Kuwaiti issue, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all other occupied territories, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all other occupied territories. In doing so, Saddam Hussein aimed to create a political effect and internal propaganda, as Iraq was increasingly admired and seen as the only real fighter for the resolution of the Palestinian question, and the various Arab masses saw the occupation of Kuwait as a price worth paying for the resolution of the Palestinian question (Primakov, 1991).

Moreover, the acceleration of the events of the crisis made the issue of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait recede in the mind of the Jordanian public, to be replaced by the issue of the struggle against foreign powers, thus transforming the conflict from Kuwaiti-Iraqi to Arab-foreign. Iraq raised the slogan of Islam and the flag of Allahu Akbar with all the memories of glory and victory that it carries in the collective culture of the nation.

Hence, we find that the Jordanian public opinion made thinking and reasoning to serve its orientations and dreams, forgetting reality and logic and drifting with the current of wishful thinking, and actually expected Iraq to win against the US-led international coalition, as the Iraqis participated with their army and provided martyrs in the Palestine War, did not stop supporting the Palestinians to liberate their land, showed their hostility to the Zionist entity, provided support for Arab causes and financially supported many Arab countries, especially Jordan (Amer, 2010). The crisis also reshaped the alliances and opposing axes in the Arab arena, revealing a change in the relationship and a divergence in orientations between some Arab masses and their political regimes, as a wide sector of the mass base and civil society organizations expressed their interest in Arab political rights (Tallilan, 2000).

References

- [1] Johnson, I. The manifestations of the Jordanian public position were characterized by the fact that it was not only managed by regimes and governments; rather, public opinion played an influential role in making foreign policy decisions.
- [2] 2. The public position was in line with Jordan's official stance on rejecting a military solution to the crisis and trying to solve it within the Arab house.
- [3] 3. The Jordanian public's attitude towards the Second Gulf War was irrational; this was due to several factors that reinforced the belief in Iraq's inevitable victory; some even considered Iraq's loss as a victory.
- [4] 4. The Muslim Brotherhood had a major role in shaping the direction of the Jordanian public attitude, and the press inflamed feelings, fully supporting Iraq with its political agendas. There was a consensus in the religious and nationalist orientation of the people.
- [5] 5. Iraq inflamed emotions by demanding that Arab oil be for the Arabs, but logically, Iraq did not have the right to control all Arab oil.
- [6] 6. There was a conflict in the people's support for the occupation of Kuwait and their rejection of the occupation of Palestine, leading to a position that favored dictatorship.
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